Theory of mind

The phrase theory of mind is used in several related ways.
 * 1) General categories of theories of mind - theories about the nature of 'mind', and its structure and processes
 * 2) Theories of mind related to individual minds.
 * 3) In recent years, the phrase "Theory of mind" has more commonly been used to refer to a specific cognitive capacity: the ability to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one's own. (following the paper "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" by David Premack and G. Woodruff, 1978)
 * 4) In philosophy, it refers to the large area of philosophy relating to mind, or to particular theories about what mind is. See main article Philosophy of mind

General category usage
In functionalist theories, functionalists like Georges Rey explore computational theories of mind that are independent of the physical instantiation of any particular mind.

In brain-mind identity theories, biologists like Gerald Edelman are concerned with the details of how brain activity produces mind and work within the confines of the identity theory of mind

Theories of mind attributable to individuals
These include theories of mind produced by individuals, such as Brentano's theory of mind. Georges Rey and Gerald Edelman were mentioned above as examples of people who deal with different broad categories of theories of mind within which they have each produced their own personal theories of mind.

"Theory of Mind" - interpersonal understanding of mental states
This theory of mind covers two separate concepts:
 * 1) Gaining the understanding that others also have minds, with different and separate beliefs, desires, mental states, and intentions
 * 2) Being able to form operational hypotheses (theories), or mental models, with a degree of accuracy, as to what those beliefs, desires, mental states, and intentions are.

A Theory of Mind appears to be a usually-innate potential ability in humans (and, some argue, in certain other species), but one requiring social and other experience over many years to bring successfully to adult fruition. It is probably a continuum, in the sense that different people may develop more, or less, effective theories of mind, varying from very complete and accurate ones, through to minimally functional. It is often implied or assumed (but not stated explicitly) that this does not merely signify conceptual understanding "other people have minds and think", but also some kind of understanding and working model that these thoughts and states and emotions are real and genuine for these people and not just ungrounded names for parroted concepts. Empathy is a related concept, meaning experientially recognizing and understanding the states of mind, including beliefs, desires and particularly emotions of others without injecting your own, often characterized as the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes".

As the title of Premack and Woodruff's 1978 article "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" indicates, it is also important to ask if other animals besides humans have a genetic endowment and social environment that allows them to acquire a theory of mind in the same way that human children do. This is a contentious issue because of the problem of inferring from animal behavior the existence of thinking, of the existence of a concept of Self or Self-awareness, or of particular thoughts. Each of us knows by introspection that we have beliefs, desires and intentions and we infer by extension and by using our own self-developed Theory of Mind, that all other humans with normal minds also share this cognitive ability, and usually have thoughts and feelings which we discover in fact differ from our own. Researchers who have spent a great deal of time with non-human apes tend to accept the likelihood that other apes like chimps also have a theory of mind. For example, Sue Savage-Rumbaugh takes this position in her book "Kanzi". Others such as C. M. Heyes (see Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates) take the position that we need not infer that chimps in the wild have any understanding of the mental states of other chimps.

There is interest in the idea that certain learned behaviors, such as human language behavior, facilitate the development of a theory of mind in both humans and chimps. In the context of language users, Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (Kanzi, page 272) has described "theory of mind" as the idea that "knowledge states of the speaker and the listener can in fact be different."

There has also been speculation that certain humans fail to progress through the normal cognitive developmental stages that lead to acquisition of a theory of mind. In 1985 Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith published an article called Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind"? in which it was suggested that the human brain normally has a "theory of mind module" and that this particular component of the brain may not develop normally in some people. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, particular brain regions that seem to be important for theory of mind have been identified. Further autism research by a team at University College London led by Peter Hobson casts light on the crucial stages of infant development.

Autistic people (including those with Asperger syndrome), and some others who do not follow the norm in childhood, often develop the theory of mind late, or not at all. However, some such people claim that in the end, the theory of mind that they have had to develop is superior to that of a normal person. The theory of mind that normal children develop appears to be that other people have different knowledge from themselves, but process their knowledge in the same way that they would. By contrast, autistic people who develop a workable theory of mind tend to be aware not only that other people have different knowledge from themselves but also that other people have a different way of thinking. (This second aspect of theory of mind is not commonly tested for, and the usual test for theory of mind - the Sally-Anne test - is biased towards the first type of theory of mind)

It is not yet established whether this different theory of mind is inherent in the autistic way of thinking, or if it is a consequence of growing up among people with a very radically and obviously different way of thinking. It has also been suggested that the autistic delay or failings in development of theory of mind is to some degree attributable to the difficulty of having to develop this more complex theory.